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ABSTRACT
This paper is aimed at explaining why higher concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not 
necessarily and automatically facilitate lower risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse 
of  powers.  As  well  as  illustrating  why effective  corporate  governance  systems  are  essential  in 
facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure, the paper also highlights why a 
consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits, is required in determining 
whether corporate governance systems will be effective or not.
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A. Introduction
The conclusions derived by Laeven and Levine that:2
Firstly,  owners who have “diversified” their  assets  have greater incentives to indulge in higher 
levels of risk taking than managers who are non shareholders and that as a result, banks which have 
powerful and diversified owners are more likely to be riskier than “widely held banks” – provided 
other factors are constantly maintained;
 
Secondly,  bank regulations such as capital  requirements and deposit  insurance,  generate  effects 
which differ when considered in relation to incentives of owners as opposed to that of managers and 
that as a result, the “comparative power of shareholders relative to managers within each bank’s 
corporate governance structure” influences the real impact of regulations on risk taking;
is acknowledged to be the result of a combination of three theories:3
• That the effect of regulation on risk is dependent on the relative influence of owners who 
exist within governance structures of individual banks 
• That bank regulators influence risk taking incentives of owners in a different manner to 
those of managers (banking theory),
• That  ownership  structures  affect  the  ability  of  owners  to  influence  risk  (corporate 
governance theory)
The first of the above conclusions, namely, that: owners who have “diversified” their assets have 
greater incentives to indulge in higher levels of risk taking than managers who are non shareholders, 
also provides further support to the argument put forward by Edwards and Nibler, who assert that in 
countries  like  the  UK and  the  US where  ownership  is  more  dispersed,  “control  is  exerted  by 
managers with considerable freedom to pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense – 
since their actions are not monitored adequately.”4
Does a greater level of dispersed ownership of firms (particularly large firms) result in greater risk 
taking levels?  Conversely,  could it  facilitate  greater  monitoring levels  -  than is  the case where 
higher  concentrations  of  ownership  exists?  This  paper  is  aimed  at  explaining  why  higher 
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concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not necessarily and automatically facilitate lower 
risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse of powers. Further, it seeks to illustrate why 
effective  corporate  governance  systems  are  essential  in  facilitating  high  levels  of  monitoring, 
accountability and disclosure.
B. Corporate Governance in Germany and the UK
The typical public limited liability company in Germany is comprised of two boards of directors, 
namely:5 i) The supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) – which could be described as the equivalent of an 
audit  committee  and  ii)  the  management  board  (Vorstand).  Whilst  the  management  board  is 
responsible  for  conducting  daily  operations  and  is  accountable  to  the  supervisory  board,  the 
supervisory board maintains oversight over the management board,  “having the power to appoint 
and dismiss members of the management board , and also to stipulate their salaries.”6
In drawing comparisons between the German and British corporate governance systems, Vieten is 
of the opinion that “it is also improbable that  the Cadbury proposals can effectively curtail the 
powers of the dominant interested party , namely the management” and that audit committees may 
“constitute no more than symbols of control” – having due regard to the German system which 
“invests power in non executive directors by statute – failing to prevent scandals.”7
“The German corporate governance system is generally considered to be a standard example of an 
insider-controlled and stake holder-oriented system.”8 However,  transformation from this  classic 
and  traditional  “insider-controlled”  system  to  a  “modern  capital  market  based  and  outsider 
controlled”  system has  been  observed.9 The  advantages  of  the  traditional  insider  systems  were 
considered to include:10
• i) Its ability to enable management to take a longer-term perspective in its planning and 
strategies
• ii) As a result of the need to finalise incomplete and implicit contracts, it offered the benefit 
of flexibility and created stronger incentives to undertake relationship- specific investments 
than a market based and purely shareholder-oriented outsider control system.”
Identified  weaknesses  of  the  system  include  criticism  that:  “The  supervisory  board  does  not 
function in the way it was intended to function.”11 As well as the reliance of the insider control 
system on informal contracting being considered to have contributed to “lack of transparency” and 
its anti competitive effects”, “a systematic neglect of the stock market, greater opportunities for 
abuse of power, the real danger that such as system is inimical to all reforms – even those which 
might  improve its  functioning without  altering its  fundamental  structure,”  are  further  criticisms 
attributed to an insider control system.12
The next section is aimed at illustrating how corporate governance systems could facilitate higher 
levels of monitoring. 
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C. Corporate Governance in Germany, the UK and the US.
The German system of corporate governance is distinguished from that which operates in Anglo 
Saxon countries owing to its incorporation of lenders and employees in the governance of large 
corporations.13 It views corporations as entities which serve the interests of shareholders –as well as 
other interests, and is defined by a legal tradition which can be traced back to the 1920s.14
Two features which distinguish the German system of corporate governance from that of the US 
and the UK include:15 
• Less dispersed/Higher concentration of the ownership of large firms. In countries like the 
UK and the US where ownership is more dispersed, it is argued that “control is exerted by 
managers  with  considerable  freedom to  pursue  their  own  interests  at  the  shareholders’ 
expense – since their actions are not monitored adequately.”16 It is argued further that there 
is  little  incentive  for  individual  shareholders  to  monitor  since  they  are  individually 
responsible  for any accrued monitoring costs  – even though such monitoring ultimately 
serves the benefit of all shareholders.17
• Involvement  of  banks  as  part  of  supervisory  boards  of  companies  (as  shareholder 
representatives). This allows banks to monitor the management of companies – particularly 
when a banker assumes the head of the supervisory board. The election of banks to the 
supervisory boards of companies (as shareholder representatives and sometimes as heads of 
supervisory boards), provides them with invaluable insight which facilitates their ability to 
monitor the management of companies.18
A further characteristic which distinguishes Germany from stock market economies exists in the 
way in  which  voting  occurs  at  annual  meetings.19 Whilst  both  stock  market  economies20 and 
universal banking systems21 share the common feature of enabling shareholders to exercise control 
over management (through votes at general meetings), in Germany, banks also own their equity22 
and “have proxy rights to vote the shares of other agents who keep their shares at the bank.”23 The 
importance of proxy voting rights stems from the fact that “it concentrates the voting power of 
13  See RH Schmidt „Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective” 2003 at page 2 of 44
14  ibid at page 3 of 44
15  J Edwards and M Nibler „Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership Concentration.“ 
2000 Journal of Economic Policy 31: 237-260
16  ibid at pages 239 and 240
17  ibid
18  ibid at page 241; This being the case where a banker assumes the head of the supervisory board – owing to the fact 
that the chairman is frequently consulted by the management (usually on a monthly basis) – whilst the full board 
may hold meetings twice a year; ibid.
19  G Gorton and F Schmid, ‘Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms’ NBER Working Paper 5453 
1996 at page 1
20  Such as the UK and the US.
21  For instance, Germany.
22  As well as having the capacity to lend
23  ibid; Such right being referred to as Auftragsstimmrecht. The bank requests for permission to vote on behalf of the 
shareholder. Even though such a right is typically granted and lasts for about 15 months, it could still be revoked. 
Even  though  such  a  right  has  its  limits,  it  enables  banks  to  exercise  a  degree  of  influence  on  management 
irregardless of banks’ equity holdings in the firm; ibid.
dispersed household shareholders in the hands of banks – making them potentially powerful.”24 The 
influence of banks (with or without proxy voting rights) may have altered dramatically over the 
years owing to the different world of German corporate finance which currently persists.  Apart 
from the fact that security markets have become more developed and complex, the extent of banks’ 
block holdings has, correspondingly, also become very much reduced.25
Having considered the above features, it can be inferred that the inclusion of banks as part of the 
supervisory boards of companies, and less dispersed ownership of large firms have the benefits of 
facilitating higher monitoring levels. However, as observed by Schmidt,26 the Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz) accords to the management board (Vorstand) a wide scope in the discharge of their 
powers.  Furthermore,  Edwards  and  Nibler  argue  that  although  banks  may  influence  corporate 
governance through their control of proxy votes, their presence on supervisory boards, and their 
provision of loan finance,  they do not  play a  role in the governance of large German firms in 
practice – that is, a role which is distinct from that of other types of large shareholders.27 They arrive 
at the conclusion that “any case for the superiority of German corporate governance of large firms” 
must accordingly “be based on high ownership concentration rather than a special role for banks” – 
as well as a consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits.”28
D. Conclusion
The dual system of disclosure which exists in Germany should facilitate greater accountability and 
disclosure. Furthermore, it should reduce the scope for the abuse of powers – if an adequate degree 
of  independence  existed  within  the  supervisory  board.  Whilst  the  weaknesses  of  an  insider 
controlled system of corporate governance have been highlighted, it is also important to add that an 
insider controlled system serves as a valuable source of acquiring information and understanding 
about a firm or company – which could otherwise, not be provided by an external expert. 
Common characteristics which audit committees and supervisory boards should ideally have, as 
revealed in a survey29 include: “That non executive directors have relevant industry experience; that 
some members should have sound grasp of current developments in financial markets; that there 
should  be  openness  to  regular  training;  that  there  should  be  distinct  appointment  policies  and 
criteria;  succession  planning  and  membership  criterion;  that  there  should  be  clear  delineation 
between their  role  and that  of  management;  that  there  should be clear  strategies for setting an 
appropriate  control  culture  within  their  organisations;  that  there  be  regular,  clearly  structured 
meetings held at least four times a year; that there exist regular flow of relevant, timely information 
24  ibid at page 2; Other ways through which banks could exert control over firms (even though such banks may appear 
to have insignificant equity holdings), include: i) “where the bank retains proxy rights – in addition to the votes 
attributed to their shares; (ii) where restrictions on voting (which prevents a block holder from exercising control) 
exists – such restrictions do not apply to bank proxy voting – giving banks unique power to the extent that they vote 
proxies; (iii) where block holders may have votes, but not enough information to use their power effectively – whilst 
banks, on the other hand, may have privileged information which they could use to their advantage – even if their 
holdings are small and even though a large block holder is present.” See ibid at page 10
25  See ibid at pages 30 and 31
26  RH Schmidt „Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective” 2003 at page 10 of 44
27 J Edwards and M Nibler „Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of Banks and Ownership Concentration.“ 
2000 Journal of Economic Policy 31 at 237; The scope of banks in influencing corporate governance “through an 
exercise of proxy votes and their representation on supervisory boards”, as further argued by Edwards and Nibler, 
“does not apply to all German firms.”
28  ibid
29  See V Beattie S Fearnely and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About ICAEW 2001 
at page 29
from company executives; private meetings meeting internal and external audit leaders; and the 
existence of self-assessment procedures.” 
Whilst  problems,  challenges  and  risks  presented  by  internal  controls  still  persist,  regulators 
currently face greater challenges presented by liquidity risks.30 As highlighted in a previous paper, 
greater  focus  on  market  based  regulation,  greater  focus  on  initiatives  and  incentives  aimed  at 
deterring management from taking undue and unneccessary risks (improved governance measures 
aimed at  ensuring that  internal  controls  are  effectively managed),  will  immensely contribute  in 
addressing these challenges.
30 For further information on liquidity risks and other risks and challenges presented to regulators, see M Ojo, „The 
Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance: Agency Problems and the Management of Risk“ at pages 2 and 
3 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15989/1/MPRA_paper_15989.pdf and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1427899; for information on the impact of regulations and disclosure requirements on risk taking levels, 
please refer to M Ojo, „The Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Risks and Risk Taking Incentives“ 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1547023> and http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/20404/1/MPRA_paper_20404.pdf and also M Ojo, „Preparing for Basel IV : why liquidity risks still 
present a challenge to regulators in prudential supervision (II)“ <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27778/  > and   
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732304>
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